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Abstract
There is a long normative ‘Social Contract’ tradition that attempts to characterize ex-post
income inequalities that are agreeable to all ‘behind a veil of ignorance.’ This paper takes a
similar normative approach to characterize social decision-making procedures. It is shown
that quite generally some form of majority-voting is preferred to unanimity ‘behind a veil of
ignorance’ whenever society faces deadweight costs in making compensating transfers.
Deviations from unanimity (or ex-post Pareto optimality) are ex-ante efﬁcient to the extent
that they economize on costly compensating transfers. Put another way, the optimal decision
rule trades off the beneﬁts of minority protection and those from greater ﬂexibility. (JEL:
H11, G33, G34, D63, P16, P48)
...W hat, failing a prior agreement, is the source of the minority’s obligation
to submit to the choice of majority?...T h em ajority principle is itself a
product of agreement, and presupposes unanimity on at least one occasion.
Jean-Jacques Rousseau
1. Introduction
In this paper we explore the consequences of contractual incompleteness for the
design of optimal social contracts. Following a long tradition going back to
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1762), we analyze political institutions (constitutions)
from the point of view of contracting “behind the veil of ignorance.” Economic
literature on this question [for example, Harsanyi (1955) and Mirrlees (1971)]
has emphasized the risk-sharing role of political institutions and asked what
kind of ex-post redistribution mechanisms society would choose to specify in a
social contract written behind the veil of ignorance.
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procedures society would choose behind the veil of ignorance. We are primarily
concerned with the latter question, albeit in the context of a redistribution
problem. The question of design of ex-post decision-making procedures arises
naturally in an incomplete contracting setting. Indeed, we begin by showing that
if the social contract is complete (so that it can specify a state-contingent public
good supply, taxation, and redistribution rule) then the optimal ex-post majority
rule is unanimity. In other words, when a group of citizens must decide whether
to move to a new position ex-post, the relevant social efﬁciency criterion is
always whether the move is Pareto improving. The reason unanimity is optimal
is that under this rule ex-post deviations from the social contract are most
difﬁcult to achieve. Since any form of ex-post deviation is suboptimal from an
ex-ante perspective (when the social contract is complete), the social decision
rule that prevents those deviations most effectively is optimal. And the most
effective rule in this respect is unanimity.
One basic reason why a unanimity rule may be undesirable is that the social
contract (or founding constitution) does not specify a decision–plan for all
future contingencies. When some unusual event occurs for which a well-adapted
decision is not speciﬁed in the social contract it may no longer be desirable from
an ex-ante perspective to attempt at all cost to prevent deviations from the
status-quo actions speciﬁed in the social contract. In our model it turns out that
some form of majority voting is desirable quite generally when the social
contract is incomplete. This is true despite two major drawbacks of majority
voting.
First, when society agrees to abandon the unanimity rule in favor of some
form of majority voting it is more likely to be exposed to Condorcet cycles.
Under unanimity, cycling is less problematic since strict social preference
orderings are transitive, and cycling can only occur on the Pareto frontier. In
contrast, under majority voting Condorcet cycles arise even for strict preference
orderings. This has been seen as an important reason for favoring a unanimity
rule over majority voting. Indeed, Condorcet cycles have been perceived to be
sufﬁciently problematic that a whole strand of literature in Social Choice has
singled out the so-called min-max majority rule (see Caplin and Nalebuff 1988)
as a good rule for ex-post social decisions. This super-majority rule is the closest
rule to a 50 percent majority rule without Condorcet cycles. The basic reasoning
in support of this rule is that it has the beneﬁt of ruling out Condorcet cycles and
it is the most ﬂexible rule with this property (see, however, Dasgupta and
Maskin 1997 for an alternative viewpoint).
Nevertheless, our analysis shows that from an ex-ante perspective, there is
no strong reason a priori for choosing the min–max rule over any other majority
rule. The basic point is that such a rule may not be ﬂexible enough from an
ex-ante perspective, and society may be prepared to pay the cost of “intrinsic
uncertainty” introduced by the possibility of Condorcet cycles in order to get
more ex-post ﬂexibility. In our model, the term “ﬂexibility” refers more explic-
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opposed to the implementation of a valuable reform.
The second drawback of majority voting, which is the main focus of this
paper, is that it may give rise to excessive ex-post redistribution, with the
majority expropriating the minority. This is the well-known problem of the
“tyranny of the majority.” Once again, we show that from an ex-ante perspective
society may be prepared to incur this cost for the sake of greater ex-post
ﬂexibility. However, the higher the scope for expropriation is the more stringent
the optimal majority rule will be.
While greater ﬂexibility and minimization of the cost of compensating
vested interests pushes one towards reducing the required size of the majority,
expropriation considerations push the ex-post decision rule towards super ma-
jority or unanimity. This trade-off between the costs of compensating vested
interests and the costs of expropriating minorities determines our optimal
majority rule.
Even though our approach is mainly normative, we believe that key ele-
ments of our theory are relevant for a positive theory of decision making in
society. For example, decision making in the European Union can be (and has
been) seen in similar terms to our theory. In the European Union decisions are
made by the European Council of Ministers. Whereas important issues—such as
EU enlargement, treaty changes, and some ﬁscal issues—require a unanimous
vote within the Council, around 80 percent of the Council’s more routine
decisions are taken by a “qualiﬁed majority vote.” A main proclaimed achieve-
ment of the recent Treaty of Nice has been the extension of qualiﬁed majority
voting to new areas such as “trade in services and the commercial aspects of
intellectual property” (Baldwin et al. 2001). Every step away from unanimity in
EU decision making is hailed as an important victory for efﬁcient decision
making. On the other hand, when a group of countries successfully holds on to
their veto right it is seen as a basic protection of sovereignty.
Our paper is related to an important body of literature in political science,
and some of the ideas discussed here have a long ancestry. Buchanan and
Tullock (1965) in particular, but also Rae (1969) and Taylor (1969) develop
closely related ideas on majority voting rules. Our contribution can be seen as
an attempt to reﬁne and expand the formal analysis of Buchanan and Tullock.
In this respect, the closest model to ours is Romer and Rosenthal (1983).
1 Our
model essentially extends Romer and Rosenthal (1983) by introducing, ﬁrst
contractual incompleteness, and second a positive deadweight cost of transfers.
Both assumptions are key to obtain a unique interior solution to the optimal
social contracting problem. Other recent incomplete contract approaches to
constitutional design include: Persson, Roland, and Tabellini (1997) and Pers-
1. Romer and Rosenthal (1983) establish that with private information about payoffs, but no
deadweight costs of transfers, a speciﬁc unanimity rule can implement the full information efﬁcient
solution.
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and Gersbach (2002) and Erlenmaier and Gersbach (1999), who signiﬁcantly
extend our analysis by allowing for more general majority voting rules than in
our paper. Finally, Aghion, Alesina, and Trebbi (2002) extend the incomplete
social contract approach in this paper to analyze the costs and beneﬁts of
insulating political leaders (from changes in voters preferences or from aggre-
gate shocks) and their implications for the design of political constitutions. They
do so in a model in which political insulation plays a similar role to that of
intellectual property right protection in a Schumpeterian model of innovation.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops our basic framework:
it introduces our main notations, formalizes the benchmark case of complete
social contracts, introduces the incomplete contracts assumption, and outlines
our simple model of majority-voting. Section 3 derives the optimal majority rule
and analyzes its comparative statics properties. Section 4 applies the basic
model to the analysis of several important facets of constitution design, such as
minority protections, vote trading, and federalism. Finally, Section 5 offers
some concluding comments.
2. The Model
2.1 Basic Setup
As we already noted, the structure of our model is similar to Romer and
Rosenthal (1983).
2 They reduce the social choice problem to a problem of
public good provision and ﬁnancing and consider a two-period situation, where,
to use their terminology, the ﬁrst period is a constitutional period and the second
a legislative period. In the constitutional period a polity of N citizens must
decide how public good provision and ﬁnancing should be determined in the
legislative period by designing a constitution which governs the process of
political decision making in the legislative period.
Between the two periods a state of nature is realized that determines both
the cost of providing different types of public good and their private beneﬁts to
each agent. We shall assume that there are n different types of public goods that
can be provided in the legislative period and that there are n possible cost
realizations si  {s1, s2,...,sn}. To keep things as simple as possible we take
the cost structure in each realization to be such that it is worth supplying at most
one type of public good. That is, in each realization only one type of public good
has a low per-capita cost of c  0 and all others have a prohibitively high cost,
k  c. We adopt the convention that under cost realization si the low cost type
public good is type i. Thus in the legislative period (when the cost realization si
is known), the social choice problem reduces to choosing whether or not to
produce public good i and how to cover its cost. We denote by pi the ex-ante
probability that cost si is realized.
2. See also Laffont (1995) for a similar setup.
41 P. Aghion & P. Bolton Incomplete Social ContractsThe N citizens differ in the utility they derive from the production of public
good i. Let bij denote agent j’s private beneﬁt from consumption of public good
i. We assume that bij can take two values, bij  B  0 and bij  b  0, so
that the N citizens can be divided into two categories: those who gain from the
provision of public good i and those who lose. We shall refer to a citizen with
bij  B as ‘fortunate’ and one with bij  b as ‘harmed.’ The ex-ante
probability that any one citizen is fortunate is given by mi. We shall assume that
each citizen’s draw of utility type is identically and independently distributed.
Thus if N is sufﬁciently large (as we shall assume throughout the analysis), then
the fraction of citizens who would beneﬁt from the provision of public good i
is approximately equal to mi. Combining the uncertainties on costs and utilities,
we shall henceforth deﬁne a state of nature as any particular realization of the
proﬁle i  (si,( bij)j) for 1  i  n and 1  j  N. Each citizen is also endowed
with some private wealth w
j  w. If we denote by gi  {0, 1} the supply of
public good i, and by ij citizen j’s total tax payment in state i, then we can
write citizen j’s payoff in state i as w  bijgi  ij.
In the legislative period, the polity of N citizens determines a choice of
public good gi and a tax-policy ij, in light of the new information about the state
of nature.
In the constitutional period all citizens are assumed to be identical, sharing
the same probability distribution over cost-realizations si and also over the
realization of types bij for any si. The ex-ante uncertainty about costs and
beneﬁts is resolved sequentially, with cost realization si occurring before the
realization of utility types bij.
Thus, just as in the model of Romer and Rosenthal, the citizens must design
a constitution or (incomplete) social contract governing the supply of public
goods in the legislative period “behind the veil of ignorance.” Each citizen’s
objective at that time is then to maximize his net expected beneﬁts from the
provision of public goods. We shall assume that under the feasible constitutional
arrangements available the net expected beneﬁt is strictly positive, so that all N
citizens have an incentive to join the polity at this stage.
A key departure from Romer and Rosenthal (1983), besides our assumption
of incompleteness of the social contract, is to assume that there is a deadweight
cost of taxation at the legislative stage, which for simplicity we take to be linear.
We denote by 	0 the cost of raising one unit of public funds. One
interpretation of this cost is simply that it represents a collection cost, or the
administrative cost of transferring funds. Another possible interpretation is that
	 reﬂects the disincentive to work or effort if wages are taxed (see Aghion and
Bolton 2002).
Unlike Romer and Rosenthal (1983) we also assume that all payoffs bij are
observable in the legislative period (except in Section 4.2). Before describing
the nature of contractual incompleteness we shall brieﬂy consider the optimal
complete contingent social contract.
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Suppose that in the constitutional period citizens are able to foresee all possible
future states of nature and to agree on a common description of the complete
state space. In this case the citizens are able to specify in advance what public
good should be supplied and how it should be ﬁnanced in every state of the
world. In other words, the citizens are able to write a completely contingent
social contract {(gi(), ij())i,j}.
Note that in the constitutional period citizens always (weakly) prefer to
write a complete social contract, if they can, leaving no room for any new
choices to be made in the future. Indeed, by writing a complete constitution they
can always replicate any outcome that would have been attained with an
incomplete constitution. In addition, some outcomes may be attainable only if
they are speciﬁed before the state of nature is realized and all citizens have
learned their preferences and positions in society.
An implicit assumption here is that citizens in our model only have
preferences over ﬁnal outcomes and do not derive any intrinsic beneﬁt from
future freedom of choice. It could be argued that this is a misrepresentation of
people’s preferences and that in reality people value the fact that the future is not
entirely predetermined. It is beyond the scope of this paper to address this
important issue. As will become clear in the next section, however, our analysis
does not crucially depend on a speciﬁc modelling of preferences. Since we
assume later that it is not technologically feasible to write a complete social
contract we do not need to take up the question of whether citizens would want
to determine all future actions if they could.
Since all citizens are identical in the constitutional period, they unanimously
prefer the social contract that maximizes their expected payoff,
w 
i1
n
pi
miB  iB  1  mib  ibgi.
where, iB and ib, respectively, denote the tax contributions of a citizen with
private beneﬁt B for public good i or b. Thus, in the constitutional period
citizens adopt the complete constitution {gi, iB, ib}, which solves the following
program:
max
gi,iB,ib
w 
i1
n
pi
miB  iB1    1  mib  ibgi
subject to the budget constraint
3:

miiB  1  miib  cgi  0
3. Note that the distortionary cost 	 is only incurred when raising taxes from each individual in
the economy.
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
gk)  0 for all k  i and,
gi)  1 if and only if [miB  1  mib  c1  .
with associated tax rule:
j
k)  0 for all k  i and,
iB  0i f gi)  0,
iB 
c1  
mi
if gi)  1, and ib  0. 
Note that since this allocation is Pareto-efﬁcient in every state , it does
indeed maximize the ex-ante utility of a citizen. Note also that the complete
social contract speciﬁes no compensation for those who are harmed by the
production of the public good. The reason is simply that a subsidy ib involves
a deadweight cost of transfers of 	ib and from an ex-ante perspective, when the
citizen’s position in society is not yet known, it is always preferable to reduce
this deadweight cost as much as possible. Of course, if citizens were risk-averse
with respect to their future position in society, they would want to allow for
some form of insurance, which would involve a positive ib. However, they
would then trade off the beneﬁts of insurance against the deadweight costs of
taxation, so that they would not want full insurance in general.
4
Finally, note that because the solution under a complete social contract is
Pareto-efﬁcient in every state , the contract will not be renegotiated under a
unanimity rule. Thus, if the social contract speciﬁes a unanimity rule to change
any terms of the contract in the legislative period it will be immune to
renegotiation. Because renegotiation of a complete social contract can only
make things worse for the founders of the constitution it is optimal for them to
make it as difﬁcult as possible to change the constitution by giving a veto power
to every citizen in the legislative period.
2.3 Incomplete Social Contracts
We shall now consider a more realistic set of social contracts that do not specify
a complete state-contingent public-good–supply-plan. A common assumption in
the incomplete contracting literature, which we also make here, is to assume that
future states of nature are not ex-post veriﬁable and that all the constitution can
do is to specify a state-independent production plan together with decision-
making rules for the choice of public good supply in the legislative period.
5
4. One might want to argue that citizens should be able to avoid all deadweight cost of insurance
by setting up an insurance fund in the constitutional period to which all citizens would be willing
to contribute. In that case, the solution would be the same whether citizens are risk-averse or not.
5. In particular, we rule out mechanisms where the decision to produce the public good or not and the
allocation of taxes and subsidies across agents would depend on messages sent by agents ex post.
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ment or the nature of government activities. They are instead devoted to a
detailed speciﬁcation of rules for future social decision making. The constitu-
tions we consider in this model, if anything, specify too much rather than too
little in terms of future public good supply relative to what is actually speciﬁed
in existing constitutions.
Thus, the incomplete social contracts we consider in the remainder of this
paper can only specify:
1) a status-quo, with a production decision g  gs and a tax rule (sj), which
both are independent of the state realization;
2) a decision rule for changing the public good decision in the legislative
period once the state of nature is realized.
We shall restrict attention to incomplete social contracts with status-quo
{gi  0 for all i, ij  0 for all j}.
6 Also, we shall assume for now that the social
contract cannot impose any restrictions on tax rates.
2.4 A Simple Model of Majority Voting
As mentioned in the introduction, there are two drawbacks with majority voting
that are often emphasized. First, the majority may be tempted to exploit the
minority. Second, with no restrictions on feasible tax schemes, majority voting
gives rise to cyclic voting. Because of these drawbacks it is not clear a priori that
majority rule would necessarily dominate unanimity. Also, because of cyclic
voting it is not clear what the outcome is under majority voting. The ﬁnal
outcome will be driven by the objectives of whomever happens to have control
over the agenda, and in the constitutional period it is difﬁcult to predict who will
be the agenda setters in the legislative period. Alternatively, even if the agenda
setters could be determined in the constitutional period, uncertainty about their
preferences would remain.
We determine the outcome of majority voting when there is cycling as
follows. Assuming that there is a net per-capita gain in supplying the public
good, we take a majority coalition to include ﬁrst, all those who gain from the
public good (the ‘fortunate’ citizens in our terminology). Second, if the total
number of fortunate citizens is not sufﬁcient to form a majority a residual
number of ‘harmed’ citizens is also part of the majority coalition.
7 The harmed
citizens in the majority coalition are picked at random from the population of
harmed citizens. In situations where the number of fortunate citizens is larger
than the majority requirement, members of the majority are picked at random
among the fortunate citizens. The agenda setters in the majority coalition are
6. See our discussion paper, Aghion and Bolton (2002) for an analysis of other status-quo points.
7. It is actually always optimal for an agenda setter(s) to include as many fortunate citizens as
possible in the majority, as this minimizes the cost of compensating those who are made worse off
by the public good.
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when fortunate citizens are not a majority in the population, the agenda setters
may need to compensate the harmed citizens in their majority.
Once a majority coalition has been determined in this way a public good supply
and tax scheme is put to a vote. The outcome is either the status-quo, if the proposal
is defeated, or the proposed change, if a majority of ml citizens votes in favor.
In an earlier version we have explored a slightly different, perhaps more
satisfactory speciﬁcation of majority voting. In this speciﬁcation an agenda
setter was selected at random in the whole population to propose a plan. This
speciﬁcation yields the same qualitative predictions. Although maybe simpler to
explain and understand, the algebra under this formulation is unfortunately less
tractable and transparent.
We assume throughout the paper that when a voter is indifferent between
the status-quo outcome and the proposed change he votes in favor of the change.
To summarize, the timeline of moves and events in our model is as follows:
1. at date 0 a constitution is written specifying: a) agenda setting rules in the
legislative period; b) a majority rule ml; c) a status-quo point,
2. at date 1 a state of nature i  (si,( bij)j) is realized, agents learn their
payoffs and the cost of production of public goods (recall that only one
public good has sufﬁciently low cost that it is worth producing),
3. fortunate citizens form a coalition, which has control over the agenda; if
the fraction mi of fortunate citizens exceeds the majority requirement ml,
then the Nml fortunate citizens who form the coalition is drawn at random
from the population of fortunate citizens Nmi; if the fraction mi of
fortunate citizens is less than the majority requirement ml then all
fortunate citizens form the coalition and select N(1  ml) harmed citizens
at random from the population of harmed citizens N(1  mi) to join the
majority coalition,
4. the coalition taking control of the agenda proposes a budget specifying
provision of a public good gi and a tax scheme (ij), which can be made
contingent on whether the taxed individual is in the majority or the
minority,
5. all agents vote in favor or against the proposed budget,
6. if the budget is approved by the required majority Nml it is implemented,
7. if it is not, the status-quo is implemented.
8. Finally all agents consume their after-tax wealth.
We shall also consider vote trading between Stages 4 and 5.
3. The Optimal Majority Rule
3.1 Stating the Optimization Problem
Suppose that a majority of Nml citizens is required to reach a decision (the
subscript l stands for legislative majority). Consider the decision problem faced
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whether to set gi  1o rgi  0 and then how to structure income taxes.
If they decide to set gi  0, the fortunate citizens in the majority ‘expro-
priate’ the minority of their wealth endowment w and share the proceeds among
themselves. Their per-capita payoff is then
w 
1  mlw1  	
minmi, ml
.
That is, each fortunate citizen in the majority gets to keep their wealth endow-
ment and also shares the net tax receipts from the minority N(1  ml)w(1 	 )
(recall that 	 denotes the unit deadweight cost of taxation).
If the majority offers to set gi  1, the minority is again expropriated. In
addition, each fortunate citizen in the majority obtains a beneﬁt
B 
ml  mi)
b  c
minmi, ml
.
The ﬁrst term is the utility beneﬁt of the public good. The second term is the cost
of the public good. Given that the minority is fully expropriated and the harmed
citizens in the majority must be kept indifferent between voting for or against
the plan, the cost of producing the public good Nc is entirely borne by the
fortunate citizens (in total number of N min(mi, ml)). In addition the fortunate
citizens must bear the cost of compensating the harmed citizens in the coalition
(ml  mi)
b, so as to keep them indifferent.
A necessary and sufﬁcient condition for the majority to produce the public
good in state i is then:
IC : B minmi, ml  bml  mi)
 	 c,
and
BC : w minmi, ml  1  mlw1  	 	 c  bml  mi)
.
The ﬁrst (incentive) condition states that the majority coalition prefers to
produce the public good. The second (budget) condition states that the majority
coalition is able to generate enough funds to cover the cost of production.
8
We shall assume throughout the paper that B and w are sufﬁciently large
8. Note that we assume here that only minority individuals are taxed, while majority individuals
voluntarily contribute to the cost of the public good, with a lower transfer cost that we normalize
at zero. Had we assumed instead that majority individuals are also taxed with the same distor-
tionary cost 	 for the amount necessary to ﬁnance the cost of the public good plus the compensation
of majority members who are harmed by the public good the budget condition would be:
BC : w minmi, ml  1  mlw1  	 	 
c  bml  mi)
](1	).
This formulation is slightly less elegant and transparent. This is why we do not pursue it in the core
of the paper. Observe also that there are basic economic reasons why the cost of taxing those who
gain from a public decision would be lower. These citizens will show more goodwill to the tax
authorities and will be more willing to comply. To simplify the exposition we make the extreme
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That is:
ASSUMPTION A1
Bmi  b1  mi 	 c, and
wmi  w1  mi1  	 	 c.
Under this assumption, condition (IC) is never binding in equilibrium, as we
shall verify next. On the other hand, the budget condition (BC) will always be
binding in equilibrium if the optimal rule ml is interior to the interval (0, 1).
When the budget condition holds, the public good is supplied and the ex-post
payoff of a fortunate citizen in the majority is then given by
i
1ml  w  B 
ml  mi)
b  c
min(mi, ml)

1  mlw1  
min(mi, ml)
.
And, the ex-ante expected payoff in state i is then
LEMMA 1 The ex-ante expected payoff under a majority rule ml satisfying
condition (BC) is equal to:
i
1ml  w  miB  1  mib  c  	1  mlw. (1)
PROOF We need to consider two cases:
(1) if ml  mi, then, using the fact that harmed citizens in the majority are
made just indifferent between producing the public good or not:
i
1ml  mii
1ml  ml  miw  1  mlb
 miB  w  ml  mib  c  1  mlw1  	
(ml  mi)w  1  mlb
 w  miB  1  mib  c  	1  mlw.
(2) if ml  mi then the fortunate citizens in the minority are expropriated
and ex-ante payoffs are:
assumption that this cost is zero. As will become clear, this assumption is not critical for our
results. Our main conclusions and comparative statics would hold under the alternative assumption
that tax collection costs are the same for all.
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1ml  mli
1ml  mi  mlB  1  mlb
 mlw  B 
c
ml

1  mlw1  	
ml   mi  mlB  1  mib
 w  miB  1  mib  c  	1  mlw.
This establishes the lemma. QED
Under a majority rule ml that does not satisfy condition (BC) the public
good is not produced and ex-ante expected payoffs are simply:
i
0ml  w  	1  mlw. (2)
Abstracting from the incentive constraint (IC), which never binds in equi-
librium under Assumption A1, the optimal majority rule ml is deﬁned as the one
that maximizes the ex-ante mean payoff:
ml 
i
pi
i
ml  1  i
(1)(ml],
where  (mi, ml) is an indicator function taking the value 1 when the
budget constraint (BC) is satisﬁed, and 0 otherwise.
3.2 The Basic Trade-off
We are now in a position to illustrate the main trade-off between reducing the
deadweight cost of taxation and ensuring an efﬁcient supply of public goods.
We shall only consider this trade-off in the special case where the fraction of
fortunate citizens is the same in all states: mi  m ˆ.
9 If we ignore for now the
incentive constraint (IC) then under assumption A1 the optimal majority rule ml
minimizes the deadweight loss from expropriation 	(1  ml)w subject to
satisfying the budget condition (BC). This is equivalent to maximizing ml
subject to satisfying the budget constraint.
Therefore, at the optimum constraint (BC) binds and the optimal majority
rule is given by:
m* l  min
w  bm ˆ  w1  	  c
w1  	  b
,1 (3)
provided that m* l 	 m ˆ. It is easy to see that under assumption A1 this inequality
always holds.
Moreover, it is also easy to check that when
wm ˆ  c  b1  m ˆ, (4)
we have m* l  1.
9. See our discussion paper, Aghion and Bolton (2002), for an analysis of the general case where
mi is random.
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m* l in i
1(ml) we obtain an ex-ante payoff:
i
1m* l  w  m ˆB  1  m ˆb  c 
	w maxb1  m ˆ  wm ˆ  c,0 
w1  	  b
.
Next, of all the majority rules that violate (BC), the best one is clearly
unanimity (ml  1) as this rule precludes any scope for expropriation.
Hence, when condition (4) holds, m* l will dominate unanimity with no
public good provision if and only if:
i
01 
 i
1m* l.
Or, equivalently, if and only if:
m ˆ B  1  m ˆb  c 
	w
b1  m ˆ  wm ˆ  c
w1  	  b
. (5)
Note ﬁnally that under Assumption A1 the incentive constraint (IC)i s
satisﬁed for majority rule m* l. To see this it sufﬁces to observe that m* l 	 m ˆ.
Suppose now that condition (4) does not hold. Then, obviously unanimity
is optimal because it prevents any form of expropriation and it is still feasible
to fund the cost of the public good as well as the compensation of all those who
are harmed by the provision of the public good.
We have thus established:
PROPOSITION 1 Under assumption A1 the optimal majority rule is given by:
m* l 
w  bm ˆ  w1  	  c
w1  	  b
whenever conditions (4) and (5) hold. The public good is then produced at
minimum deadweight loss. Otherwise, the optimal rule is unanimity and the
public good is produced if and only if wm ˆ 	 c  b(1  m ˆ).
PROOF See the discussion above. QED
This proposition delivers interesting comparative statics properties. In par-
ticular, the rule m* l is a decreasing function of the taxation cost 	 and the
production cost c: an increase in either of these costs will push one towards
reducing the majority requirement ml in order to guarantee that the public good
can be ﬁnanced. On the other hand, when 	 increases, condition (5) is harder to
satisfy. Therefore, beyond a certain point an increase in 	 and/or c will result in
a jump in the optimal majority rule to ml  1. Thus, there is a nonmonotonic
relation between ml and 	. Starting from low values of 	 an increase in this
parameter lowers the optimal majority rule, but beyond a certain point it
increases it.
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increase in w raises the super-majority rule because there is more to expropri-
ate.
10 The majority rule is also decreasing in b
11: an increase in b results in a less
stringent majority rule in order to reduce the cost of compensation and thereby
facilitate public good provision.
3.3. Asymmetric Information
It is generally not possible in practice to know exactly each voter’s payoff. That
is, even if the distribution of preferences in the population may be commonly
known it is not possible to know each voter’s preferences. But our theory so far
has relied on the assumption that fortunate citizens can be identiﬁed and
combined in a majority supporting public good provision. We have also relied
on the assumption that if a group of harmed citizens must be persuaded to join
the majority coalition then only that group will be targeted with compensating
transfers. When individual voters’ preferences are private information wouldn’t
every member joining the majority coalition insist on getting a compensating
transfer? If so, wouldn’t that undermine our whole theory?
We show in this section that this is not necessarily the case. Even though
more compensating transfers need to be made under private information to build
a majority coalition the theory developed under the simplifying assumption of
complete information is essentially unchanged.
To see this, suppose that the fraction mi  m ˆ (respectively 1  mi)o f
individuals with utility B (respectively b) in any state i is common knowl-
edge, but that a particular individual’s payoff is private information. Also,
suppose that nature selects a fortunate individual at random to be the agenda
setter. This agenda setter still needs to compensate a positive fraction of ‘harmed
citizens’ in the population in order to secure a majority ml in favor of producing
the public good whenever m ˆ  ml.
The key question with privately known preferences is how big a fraction of
voters need the agenda setter compensate? We shall show that this fraction need
not be substantially larger than (ml  m ˆ). If he pays b to a fraction x of voters,
by the law of large numbers this will make (1  m ˆ)x harmed citizens vote in favor
of producing the public good. Therefore, after being promised this compensation the
total number of voters in favor of public good provision will be:
1  m ˆ x  m ˆ.
10. Differentiating (3) with respect to w, we have:
dm* l
dw

	bm ˆ  b  c1  	
w1  	  b
2  0.
11. We have:
dm* l
db

1  m ˆw1  	  m ˆw  c
w1  	  b
2 ,
which is negative when m* l  m ˆ as a result of (BC).
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needs to be greater than or equal to the majority requirement ml. That is, the
fraction x must be at least equal to:
x* 
ml  m ˆ)

1m ˆ
.
Note that although this fraction is higher than the fraction of harmed citizens
(ml  mi)
 that are compensated under symmetric information it is far from
being equal to ml. As more compensating transfers are needed under asymmetric
information about preferences the budget constraint (BC) for public good
provision will be tighter than that under symmetric information:
BCai : w minml, m ˆ  w1  	1  ml 	
ml  m ˆ)

1m ˆ
b  c.
As a result, the optimal majority rule under asymmetric information—for which
the incentive constraint (BCai) is binding—will be lower.
12 That is:
ml
ai 

w1  m ˆ  bm ˆ  
w1  	  c1  m ˆ
w1  	1  m ˆ  b
,
which is strictly lower than the optimal majority rule under symmetric information
ml 
w  bm ˆ  w1  	  c
w1  	  b
.
We have thus established:
PROPOSITION 2 When voters’ preferences are private information the compen-
sation costs required to form a majority are larger and the optimal majority rule
is lower and given by:
ml
ai  maxm ˆ,

w1  m ˆ  bm ˆ  
w1  	  c1  m ˆ
w1  	1  m ˆ  b .
It is not surprising that more compensating transfers are needed when
‘harmed citizens’ cannot be identiﬁed precisely. It is also not surprising that the
constitution designers would lower the majority requirement if compensation
costs are higher and the risks of expropriation of the minority lower (because the
agenda setter must, so to speak, cast a wider net to be sure of getting a sufﬁcient
majority supporting his policy). What is slightly more surprising is that the
agenda setter must not compensate a wider fraction of voters than
12. We can ignore the incentive constraint (IC) because it is unaffected by information asym-
metry about preferences.
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ml  m ˆ)

1m ˆ
.
It is interesting to contrast our result here with the analysis of Romer and
Rosenthal (1983). They establish that with private information about payoffs but
no deadweight costs of transfers, a unanimity rule together with highly inefﬁ-
cient status-quo points can implement the full information efﬁcient solution.
Such a solution would be inefﬁcient in our setting precisely because it requires
large transfers and therefore also imposes large deadweight costs of transfers.
We close this subsection with two remarks:
REMARK 1 In the discussion here we have continued to assume that those who
beneﬁt from the public good will continue to contribute their share of the cost
of the public good at no deadweight loss. This assumption is not necessarily
inconsistent with private information about preferences if the lower cost of
taxation is due to greater goodwill towards the tax authorities and greater
willingness to comply among those who beneﬁt from public policies, as we have
argued. In the extreme case where any fortunate citizen behaves exactly as if she
were harmed by the public policy the budget constraint would become:
BCai : w minml, m ˆ  w1  	1  ml 	
ml  m ˆ)

1m ˆ
b  c1  	,
and the optimal majority rule would be reduced even further to:
ml
ai  maxm ˆ,

w ˜1  m ˆ  bm ˆ  
w ˜1  	  c1  m ˆ
w ˜1  	1  m ˆ  b ,
where
w ˜ 
w
1  	
.
In this extreme case also it may not always be feasible to fund the cost of the
public good under assumption A1. A stronger condition is then required.
REMARK 2 Tax and subsidy policies targeted at particular citizens may be seen
to be unrealistic. That is, differential treatments between two citizens who
appear to be identical ex ante may seem far-fetched. However, in reality, there
are many instances of different treatment across regions, districts or professions.
Thus, the tax/subsidy policy described here should be interpreted as illustrating
such forms of targeted policies.
4. Applications to Constitution Design
We have shown that when social contracts (or constitutions) are highly incom-
plete the optimal majority rule can be determined from a simple trade-off
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protecting minorities from expropriation. We have also shown that the basic
analysis is robust to the introduction of asymmetric information. In this section
we use this basic theory and our simple framework to shed light on other
important aspects of the design of constitutions. We begin by analyzing several
important minority protections that are found in most constitutions. These
protections range from basic human rights to absolute ceilings on taxation. We
then proceed with a discussion of the difﬁcult and contentious issue of vote
trading. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of the costs and beneﬁts of
federalism and the role of bicameralism.
4.1 Minority Protection
In this subsection we consider several minority protections that are commonly
found in constitutions: amendment rights, constitutional limits on taxation, and
equal tax rules. We determine how these rules affect the optimal majority rule
and ex-ante welfare. A broad intuition applies to all these rules: to the extent that
they reduce the scope for expropriation they should result in lower optimal
majority requirements than would be the case in the absence of minority
protections. Whether lower majority rules combined with minority protections
raise ex-ante welfare, however, is a priori not obvious.
4.1.1. Amendment Rights Many constitutions allow members of the legislature
to make amendments to a bill proposed by a committee or the government.
Obviously, the power to make such amendments raises the power and protection
of a minority ex-post. We shall follow Baron and Ferejohn (1987, 1989) and
model amendment rights in a highly stylized way as follows. Suppose that the
legislative process takes two successive rounds. The ﬁrst round is as before,
with the majority of fortunate citizens acting as agenda-setters and putting a bill
to a vote. If the bill is passed by the required majority the legislature adjourns.
Otherwise, if the unamended bill is not passed in the ﬁrst round, we allow
harmed citizens in the majority to propose an amendment and set the new
agenda in a second round. If the required majority votes in favor of the amended
bill in the second round it is passed. Otherwise, the status-quo is implemented.
No more than two rounds during the whole legislative process need be consid-
ered to analyze amendment rights in our model. All individuals have the same
discount factor  between the two rounds.
Let us reason by backward induction, and suppose that the ﬁrst bill has been
rejected,sothatitisuptotheagenda-settersinthesecondroundtomakeanewproposal.
In equilibrium, the agenda setters in the second round will be able to extract up to
min(m ˆ B, m ˆw)  ,
from the fortunate citizens in exchange for agreeing to supplying the public
good ( is equal to the minimum of what the fortunate citizens are willing or
able to pay). Now, moving back to the ﬁrst round, if the majority does not agree
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off rejecting the fortunate citizens’ proposal in the ﬁrst round and proposing an
amended bill in the second round. Thus the budget condition for public good
provision now becomes:
BCar : m ˆw  1  mlw1  	 	 c  bml  m ˆ  .
As before the optimal majority rule will minimize the deadweight loss 	(1 
ml)w subject to (BCar). At the optimum, the constraint will again be binding,
which in turn yields the new optimal majority rule:
ml
ar  maxm ˆ,
w  bm ˆ  w1  	  c  
w1    b ,
which is smaller than the optimal majority requirement in the absence of
amendment rights.
This latter conclusion, in turn immediately implies that the ex-ante expected
welfare of a representative individual
i
1ml  w  m ˆB  1  m ˆb  c  	1  mlw
is reduced by introducing amendment rights. This is not entirely surprising:
amendment rights require a larger compensation of harmed citizens ex post.
This, in turn, forces a reduction in the majority requirement ex ante for the budget
constraint to still hold with the higher compensation requirements of harmed
citizens in the majority coalition. This has the effect of increasing the scope for
inefﬁcient expropriation. We highlight this conclusion in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 3 Amendment rights result in a lower optimal majority requirement
and increase the scope for expropriation sufﬁciently to lower ex-ante expected
payoffs for the representative citizen.
Note that this result would be unchanged if we also allowed members of the
minority to make amendments in the second round. The reason is simply that
these members cannot affect the outcome of voting in the ﬁrst round.
If amendment rights reduce welfare, why then are they so prevalent? What
elements of reality are we missing in our simple model? For one, an important
simplifying assumption in our model is that all citizens are risk neutral. If they
were risk averse, amendment rights might possibly be an optimal way of
providing insurance and reducing the variance of ex-post payoffs, even if they
also increase the deadweight costs of expropriation. Another rationale behind
amendment rights is that they lead to better laws that are more ﬁne-tuned to the
particular needs of a subset of citizens.
4.1.2 Equal Tax Rates Another way of providing minority protections is through
equal treatment rules. In our stripped-down model such rules might translate
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are rather subtle. Under some circumstances (e.g., when deadweight costs of
transfers are relatively low) such a rule may not provide any protection to the
minority against expropriation and may be counterproductive. However, under
other circumstances the rule has the effect of inducing the majority to lower the
tax burden and thus provides a welfare improving protection.
Note ﬁrst that if the constitution requires all individuals to bear the same tax
burden this rule would not make any difference in our model if, as we have
assumed so far, the agenda setters are free to redistribute tax revenues as they
please and if there are no deadweight costs of transferring public funds beyond
tax collection costs from harmed citizens.
For more general speciﬁcations of deadweight costs of public transfers one
suspects, however, that an equal tax rule ought to have some bite and might
increase ex-ante welfare by reducing the scope for expropriation of the minority.
Accordingly, suppose for the sake of argument that the same distortionary cost
	 applies to all individuals and all transfers, whether taxes collected or redis-
tributed. Under this speciﬁcation of deadweight costs there are even greater
beneﬁts than before in avoiding unnecessary or redundant transfers. That is,
there are larger savings from eliminating taxes and subsidies to an individual
citizen that cancel one another out.
With this new speciﬁcation of deadweight costs of transfers the budget
condition takes the form
BCet : w1  	 	 
c  b  wml  m ˆ1  	,
where the LHS represents maximum tax revenues net of the distortionary cost
of tax collection, and the RHS is the total expenditure towards the cost of the
public good and the compensating transfers to harmed citizens in the majority
coalition. When this budget condition is slack there are two possibilities for
ex-post tax policy:
1. the (equal) tax rate is reduced to the point where the budget constraint is
binding in order to save on costly public transfers,
2. taxes are kept high and unspent tax revenues are redistributed to fortunate
citizens at a deadweight cost 	 per unit transferred.
As long as 	 is not too high, fortunate citizens in the majority maximize
their payoff by imposing maximal equal taxes on every citizen and then
redistributing surplus tax revenues to themselves. This is the case whenever
13
13. A fortunate citizen is better off if a marginal increase in (equal) taxes results in a higher
income after tax and redistribution. The deadweight loss in her own income of an increase in tax
is
w1  1  
2.
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We proceed ﬁrst with this assumption.
Expected ex-ante utility of a representative citizen under the equal tax rule
(net of distortionary costs from taxes and transfers) is then given by:
ml  w  m ˆB  1  m ˆb  	w  	
c  b  wml  m ˆ
	(w1  	  
c  b  wml  m ˆ1  	)
   	
2b  wml  m ˆ,
where  is a constant.
The optimal majority rule ml
et is, as always, the one that maximizes (ml)
or equivalently ml subject to the budget constraint (BCet). Therefore, whenever
an interior solution obtains it is given by:
ml
et 
m ˆw  b 
w1  	
1  	
 c
w  b
.
Contrast this solution with the one obtained in the absence of an equal
taxation restriction. In that case the budget condition is
BCnoet : wm ˆ  1  mlw1  	 	 
c  bml  m ˆ1  	.
The key difference between the two budget conditions is that under ‘tax
discrimination’ the members of the majority (including harmed citizens) get a
lower optimal tax rate to avoid redundant public transfers (taxing their income
and then giving it back to them in the form of a public transfer). In fact, these
citizens do not get taxed at all, while everyone else in equilibrium gets taxed the
maximum rate. This latter observation follows from the fact that the ex-ante
optimal majority rule is the largest ml for which (BCnoet) holds:
The gain in higher subsidies is
1  	
2w
1  ml
m ˆ
,
the net total tax revenues extracted from the minority shared equally among all fortunate citizens
in the majority.
Therefore, higher (equal) taxes are preferred if and only if
1  1  	
2  1  	
2 1  ml
m ˆ
or,
1  ml
m ˆ
	
	2  	
1  	
2 .
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noet 
m ˆ
w
1  	
 b	 
w1  	
1  	
 c
w
1  	
 b
.
Inspection of ml
noet and ml
et yields the result: ml
et  ml
noet. In other words, an
equal tax amendment results in a lower majority rule. The reason is that the
equal tax restriction increases compensation costs by forcing agenda setters to
make redundant distortionary public transfers. This distortion results in a lower
majority rule, since at the margin a lower majority requires lower redundant
public transfers. As one might expect from this discussion ex-ante welfare is
lower under an equal tax amendment. Indeed, such an amendment does not
really provide any protection to the minority against expropriation and without
this amendment discriminatory taxation can entirely eliminate the deadweight
costs of redundant taxation.
Would there be any beneﬁts from an equal tax amendment if the opposite
assumption
1  ml
m ˆ

	2  	
1  	
2
holds? In that case the agenda setters want to set as low as possible a tax rate
subject to satisfying the budget condition. Hence, the amendment does indeed
provide some form of protection against expropriation of the minority for some
majority rules ml.
Since agenda setters want to minimize the overall tax burden under this
scenario the optimal majority rule is the one that minimizes redundant transfers
and is given by ml
et  m ˆ. Indeed, under this rule the equilibrium tax rate is given
by
* 
c
w1  
2 ,
and expropriation of the minority is reduced to a minimum. We summarize our
analysis in the proposition here:
PROPOSITION 4 An equal tax rule provides no minority protections against
expropriation, results in a lower majority rule
ml
et 
m ˆw  b 
w1  	
1  	
 c
w  b
,
and lower ex-ante welfare when deadweight costs of transfers are relatively low
and satisfy the condition:
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Otherwise, an equal tax rule induces agenda setters to minimize the tax burden
ex-post, results in a lower majority rule ml
et  m ˆ, and higher ex-ante welfare.
4.1.3 Tax Limits Another way of providing minority protections is through tax
ceilings or minimum income exemptions. Are these equally undesirable? In
other words, is the optimal tax ceiling *  1? To see the effects of such
protections in our model suppose that the constitution can impose both a
majority rule ml and an upper bound  on the fraction of individual wealth that
can be taxed. For a given  the budget condition now becomes:
BCtl : m ˆw  1  mlw1   	 c  bml  m ˆ.
And the expected ex-ante utility of a representative individual under the veil of
ignorance, is now:
ml,   w  m ˆB  1  m ˆb  1  mlw.
The optimal constitution (ml, ) is the one that maximizes (ml, ) subject to
(BCtl). Using the fact that the budget constraint is binding at the optimum, we
can substitute for (1  ml) as a function of ml alone into the maximand. Then
the optimal rule ml
tl is the solution to:
min
ml	m ˆ
1  ml 
c  bml  m ˆ
w1  

m ˆ
1  
.
We thus immediately obtain:
ml
tl  m ˆ.
Substituting for ml
tl in the budget condition we also obtain the optimal tax ceiling

tl 
c  m ˆw
w1  m ˆ1  
.
Note that *  1 under assumption A1.
Thus, once again we obtain an optimal majority rule which is strictly less
than the optimal rule under no tax limits. But, now the lower majority rule
results in a welfare improvement. Indeed the previous solution   1 and ml 
m* l is still attainable here but is shown to be dominated.
So, why do tax ceilings improve ex-ante welfare? The reason is that tax
ceilings are a more direct way of limiting expropriation of the minority than a
majority rule. By controlling expropriation directly through  it is possible to
avoid including harmed citizens in the majority, which would require costly
transfers, and limit expropriation of the minority to a level just sufﬁcient to raise
sufﬁcient revenues to cover the cost of the public good.
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some states of nature may occur in which it is not possible to raise enough funds
to cover the cost of the public good. If a state of nature arises with mi such that
c  miw
w1  mi1  	
 1,
Bmi  1  mib  c,
and this state of nature occurs with a high probability, then it may be ex-ante
optimal to set   1. In general, however, such a knife-edge case is unlikely and
some tax limits will generally be optimal.
4.2 Vote Trading
Our model can be used to discuss the issue of whether or not vote trading should
be allowed. Vote trading used to be a common practice in the United States and
the United Kingdom until the end of the nineteenth century when secret ballots
were introduced. It is commonly seen as undemocratic by political scientists, but
many free-market economists advocate the introduction of vote trading as a way
of introducing market efﬁciency into the political sphere. Economists favoring
vote trading argue that it increases aggregate welfare by allowing for the
expression of intensity of preferences. Someone without strong preferences over
the political outcome can sell her vote to someone with bigger stakes (see e.g.,
Casella 2002). Opponents of vote trading, on the other hand, argue that it
exacerbates the inequality between rich and poor and that it undermines plu-
ralism.
Without attempting to resolve this debate, our analysis highlights another
important drawback of vote trading, which has been elegantly expressed in
general terms as follows by Thomas Schelling:
What is a secret ballot but a device to rob the voter of his power to sell his
vote? It is not alone the secrecy, but the mandatory secrecy, that robs him of
his power. He not only may vote in secret, but he must if the system is to
work. He must be denied any means of proving which way he voted. And
what he is robbed of is not just an asset that he might sell; he is stripped of
his power to be intimidated; he is made impotent to meet the demands of
blackmail. There may be no limit to violence that he can be threatened with
if he is truly free to bargain away his vote, since the threatened violence is not
carried out anyway if it is frightening enough to persuade him. But when the
voter is powerless to prove that he complied with the threat, both he and those
who would threaten him know that any punishment would be unrelated to the
way he actually voted. And the threat being useless, goes idle. [Schelling
1960, p. 148]
14
14. We thank an anonymous referee for bringing this passage to our attention.
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for expropriation of voters. Indeed if one allows for vote trading, the agenda
setters will be able to extract the whole transferable surplus from all other voters
by threatening to push a majority member into the minority (in other words, by
playing on Bertrand competition for the tradeable right to belong to the major-
ity). Thus, in our model vote trading is inefﬁcient as it increases the deadweight
loss from expropriation under majority voting.
More formally, let the agenda setters be the fortunate as in the basic model,
and suppose that mi  m ˆ and suppose that the majority rule is such that ml 
m ˆ. If there is no vote trading then the agenda setters must offer a compensating
transfer b to all ‘harmed citizens’ doing the majority coalition. But with vote
trading the agenda setter can buy N(ml  m ˆ) ‘harmed citizen’ votes instead of
bribing a fraction (ml  m ˆ)o f‘harmed citizens’ into voting for his proposal. The
total demand for ‘harmed citizen’ votes is then N(ml  m ˆ), but the total supply
is N(1  m ˆ). In other words, as long as ml  1 the total supply exceeds demand.
With excess supply of votes the equilibrium price will be equal to zero and the
agenda setters can expropriate all ‘harmed citizens’ without compensating any
of them as long as everyone believes that the agenda setters will be able to bring
together the required majority of votes. This is true for all majority rules barring
unanimity. Therefore, under vote trading it is easier to expropriate the minority.
Moreover an increase in the majority requirement is no protection unless the
rule is unanimity. Thus, under vote trading the expected ex-ante payoff

1,vtml  w  m ˆB  1  m ˆb  	1  minm ˆ, mlw  c,
is lower than the ex-ante payoff 
1(ml) in the absence of vote trading.
Although this observation follows straightforwardly from our analysis it is
sufﬁciently important to be worth highlighting in the following proposition.
PROPOSITION 5 Vote trading increases the scope for expropriation and lowers
ex-ante expected payoffs for the representative individual. Only unanimity
constitutes a protection against expropriation.
A parallel can be drawn here with the literature on corporate takeovers (see
Grossman and Hart 1980, 1988). For any majority rule (except unanimity) a
value decreasing takeover can always succeed. The reason is the same as here:
excess supply of shares tendered at a price per share marginally higher than the
post-takeover value. Interestingly, some corporate law scholars have advocated
banning tender offers and allowing only corporate control changes through
majority voting in proxy contests because of these undesirable outcomes of
tender offers (see Lipton and Rowe 2001).
4.3 Federalism versus Separatism
Our analysis also sheds light on the issue whether several independent states (or
regions) should federate into a single legislative entity. It has often been
suggested that if southern states of the United States had been able to secede,
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civil rights movement might not have succeeded in those states. It is the majority
in Northern states supporting the abolition of slavery and later the civil rights
movement that have constituted the best protection for minorities in the South
and elsewhere in the United States. This example vividly illustrates the potential
beneﬁt of belonging to a federation: a minority in one state can ﬁnd protections
in similarly minded majorities in other states. We provide a simple formal
analysis of this idea in this subsection.
Our analysis points to the following effects. On the one hand, federalism
reduces the risk of being in the exploited minority. This in turn leads to a less
stringent majority rule and therefore facilitates public good provision. On the
other hand, a lower majority rule under federalism can also result in an increase
in equilibrium expropriation.
To see the costs and beneﬁts of federalism more precisely consider the
simple scenario of two identical states that share the same ex-ante uncertainty
over the costs and beneﬁts of public good provision. Assume that in each region
the fraction of fortunate citizens mi is random and that it is independently
distributed across the two regions as follows:
mi 
m  with probability q
m  with probability 1  q,
where q  1⁄2 and m   m .
We begin by deriving the equilibrium outcome under separatism. We then
compare this outcome to the one under federalism. Finally, we brieﬂy discuss
the role of bicameralism or a second legislature representing the interests of
member states in a federation by modeling the bicameral constitution in the
reduced form of a veto right of each state.
4.3.1 Separatism Consider ﬁrst each state separately. From our analysis in
Section 3.1, we know that the optimal majority rule ml in each state solves the
following maximization program:
max
ml
ml  w  w	1  ml  q
m B  1  m b  c  m , ml
 1  q
m B  1  m b  c  m , ml,
(where  (mi, ml) is the indicator function taking the value 1 whenever
the budget constraint (BC) is satisﬁed, and 0 otherwise).
Assuming that conditions (4) and (5) hold both for mi  m  and mi  m  then
the optimal majority rule ml can only take the following two values:
m  l  lm  
w  bm   w1    c
w1    b
,
or
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w  bm   w1    c
w1    b
.
Under the lower majority rule the public good is always produced and ex-ante
expected payoffs are:
m  l  w 
	w
b1  m   wm   c
w1  	  b
 q
m B  1  m b  c
 1  q
m B  1  m b  c.
(6)
Under the higher majority rule the public good is only produced when mi 
m  and ex-ante expected payoffs are
m  l  w 
	w
b1  m   wm   c
w1  	  b
 q
m B  1  m b  c. (7)
Comparing the payoffs in equations (6) and (7) we observe that the stricter
majority rule is optimal if and only if
	ww  b
w1  	  b
m   m  	 1  q
m B  1  m b  c. (8)
This is a very intuitive condition. If the deadweight costs of expropriating
the minority—as measured by w and/or 	—are large and a high realization for
mi is likely, then it is optimal to set a stringent majority requirement to reduce
expropriation costs. Note in particular that when mi  m  is likely then there is
only a small risk of not producing the public good in the event where mi  m .
In the remaining part of this subsection we shall restrict attention to parameter
values such that condition (8) holds. Then, under separatism, the net ex-ante
payoff of a representative individual is equal to:

sep  q
m B  1  m b  c  w  w	1  lm . (9)
4.3.2 Comparing Federalism and Separatism What happens if the two regions
decide to federate? First, the aggregate fraction of fortunate citizens Ms in the
federation will be distributed according to:
Ms 
m  with probability q
2
m   m 
2
with probability 2q1  q
m  with probability 1  q
2.
With this distribution of Ms it remains suboptimal to set the majority rule equal
to m  l as this would expose the representative individual to excessive expropri-
ation. However, for suitable parameter values it will be optimal to set the
majority rule in the federation equal to:
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m   m 
2 	 
w  b
m   m 
2 	  w1    c
b  w1  
,
in order to facilitate public good provision. In that case, the ex-ante mean payoff
of an individual under federalism will be equal to:

fed  q
2
m B  1  m b  c  2q1  q

m   m 
2
B 1 
m   m 
2 	b  c  w  w	1  l
m   m 
2 		
(10)
Comparing the payoffs under separatism in (9) and federalism in (10) we get:

fed  
sep  q1  q
m B  1  m b  c  w	,
where:
  m  l  l
m   m 
2 	  0.
Thus, by relaxing the majority requirement, federalism increases the probability
of public good provision, but does it at the cost of increasing the total dead-
weight loss from expropriation. In particular when q is sufﬁciently large—so
that the expected gain of increasing public good provision under federalism
(1  q)(m B  (1  m )b  c) is smaller than the expected expropriation cost
w	—separatism will prevail. On the other hand, if q is small and/or the net
expected beneﬁt from public good provision m B  (1  m )b  c is large, the
opposite is true and federalism will tend to dominate.
15 This establishes:
PROPOSITION 6 Under Federalism the overall risk of expropriation is reduced
and the optimal majority requirement is (weakly) lower than under Separatism.
This gives rise to (weakly) higher public good provision. Federalism dominates
Separatism when the expected gain from increasing public good provision is
greater than the increase in aggregate cost from expropriation under a lower
majority requirement. That is, when m B  (1  m )b  ci ss u f ﬁciently large and
q sufﬁciently small.
In other words, what federalism does is to increase the blocking power of
harmed individuals by merging them with fortunate citizens from another region
or state. This reduces the need for a high majority rule. Under a lower majority
rule fewer harmed citizens will need to be compensated ex-post. This in turn
makes it possible to have the public good produced more often than under
15. Note that majority rules l(m ) and l(m ) under federalism cannot give rise to higher expected
payoffs than under separatism since these rules would only replicate an outcome attainable under
separatism.
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will be higher.
4.3.3 The Scope for Bicameralism The issue of whether one should have one or
two chambers, and of what role should be assigned to the second chamber, have
long been the subject of intense debates among Constitutional Law scholars.
One view is that a second chamber may help monitor the ﬁrst chamber and
provide a further opportunity to amend or reject unsatisfactory reform projects.
For example, this is broadly what the French “Senat” is supposed to accomplish,
although it is often argued that what this second chamber actually does is to
increase the power of vested interests, especially that of landowners. An
alternative view is that a second chamber may help control or reduce inequality
across different regions or states within a country. This view is probably best
exempliﬁed by the German Bundesrat, whose main purpose is to preserve a
balance between the various German “La ¨nder.” Interestingly, the model of
federalism outlined above, allows us to discuss some pros and cons of a
German-type of bicameral system.
Thus consider the above model with two states that share the same ex-ante
uncertainty over the costs and beneﬁts of public good provision, with the
fraction of fortunate citizens mi in each state being random with:
mi 
m  with probability q
m  with probability 1  q,
where q  1⁄2 and m   m . And suppose that it is optimal ex ante for the two
states to federate into one country. Then, introducing a second chamber in which
there is a one state–one vote rule and a qualiﬁed majority of states for a reform
to pass, in our model with only two states amounts to introducing a veto power
for each separate state.
Suppose that the federal constitution speciﬁes that once the required ma-
jority of individuals in the federation has voted in favor of the public good
provision, the decision can be vetoed by a representative from each state. In this
case when mi  m  in one state (say state 1) and mi  m  in the other state (say
state 2), then the representative in state 2 will require an additional compensa-
tion E (say, E  (1  m )b  m B) in order not to veto the decision. However,
imposing such ex-post redistribution will tighten the budget condition for public
good provision, which in turn will lead to a lower majority rule in equilibrium.
Therefore, a higher expected deadweight loss from taxation of the minority and
lower ex ante welfare may result from such a veto right. This result should not
be surprising, as bicameralism in this case is similar to allocating amendment
rights to representatives from each state.
We have just pointed to a negative welfare effect of bicameralism. But we
can also point to at least two positive effects in the context of our model. First,
as with amendment rights, the redistributive impact of bicameralism may
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only impose additional redistribution across regions ex post. It may also prevent
unequal (average) taxation of the two regions. Thus, bicameralism may prevent
the majority from raising more than the amount (1  m )w of taxes in both states.
As with tax limits, this should limit the scope for costly expropriation and
thereby increase ex-ante welfare.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we have developed an incomplete contracting framework to
characterize an optimal decision rule under the veil of ignorance. We have
established that: (1) the optimal majority rule results from a trade-off between
minimizing the costs of compensating vested interests on the one hand and
minimizing the scope for expropriation on the other hand; (2) the optimal
majority rule depends on the characteristics of the reform (size and distribution
of gains and losses across individuals) and on underlying characteristics of the
economy (taxation cost, individual wealth, exposure to expropriation); (3) the
trade-off between compensation costs and expropriation governs other aspects
of constitutional design such as amendment rights, tax limits or equal tax rules,
vote trading, federalism, and bicameralism.
Our analysis in this paper can be extended in several interesting directions.
First, other aspects of constitution design, such as the choice of electoral rules
(proportional versus majoritarian), term limits for politicians in ofﬁce, the
balance of powers between the legislative, executive, and judiciary powers, and
the role of balanced budget provisions can be analyzed using our framework.
Whereas speciﬁc models may be required to analyze each of these issues, they
ought to rely on the same incomplete contracting methodology and to encom-
pass similar trade-offs as in this paper.
Second, our framework can be adapted to analyze the optimal choice of
decision rule to govern constitutional change. A natural way of looking at
constitutional change within our incomplete contract setting is as a mechanism
to renegotiate the social contract.
Third, our incomplete social contract methodology may also be relevant for
the analysis of collective decision making and the design of governance struc-
tures in other types of institutions and organizations such as private committees,
cooperatives, ﬁrms and bankruptcy procedures. In particular, our approach
might shed light on observed differences across the corporate charters of public
versus privately held companies, for example with regard to minority share-
holder protection. To the extent that shareholders in public companies can more
easily exit through selling their shares, the scope for expropriating minority
shareholders should be relatively smaller in such companies. Our analysis would
therefore predict that one should observe more stringent protection rules in
privately held ﬁrms. Analyzing this and other aspects of the design of corporate
charters appears to be another promising avenue for further research.
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